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TAX REFORM UP IN THE AIR: REDEFINING THE TEST
FOR QUALIFICATION OF AN AIR CARRIER
FOR SALES TAX EXEMPTION
DANIEL W. SEPULVEDA*
I. INTRODUCTION
IN EPIC AVIATION V. TESTA, the Supreme Court of Ohio ex-amined an exception to an Ohio sales tax statute for the
purchase of jet fuel by an air carrier working as a public utility
service.1 Specifically, the court looked at whether that exception
requires the air carrier to have a “certificate of public conve-
nience and necessity from the federal government.”2 In review-
ing applicable case law, including its own prior holdings, the
court found not only that the statute requires no such thing, but
that its own former decisions needed clarification.3 The court
declared that the proper test for an air carrier to qualify as a
public utility service, and therefore qualify for the sales tax ex-
ception, was the common-carrier test and not the existence of
sufficient agency regulation.4 In doing so, the court corrected a
loophole that effectively prevented air carriers without a certifi-
cate of public convenience and necessity from qualifying for the
exception altogether,5 one that likely was the result of the Air-
line Deregulation Act (ADA) implemented over thirty years
prior.6 Had the court taken the easy way out and agreed with the
lower courts, the exception would have no teeth and its purpose
would have been thwarted. In remedying its own prior oversight,
* Daniel W. Sepulveda is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2019, at SMU
Dedman School of Law. He received his B.B.A. in Accounting from Baylor
University in 2006. Daniel would like to thank his beautiful wife, Rachel, for
believing in him, encouraging him, and faithfully following him wherever life
leads.
1 Epic Aviation, L.L.C. v. Testa, 74 N.E.3d 358, 359 (Ohio 2016).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 362–63.
4 Id. at 365.
5 Id. at 363.
6 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
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the court’s decision is laudable and should serve as a model for
other courts.
The plaintiff in the case, Epic Aviation (Epic), was a jet fuel
vendor.7 Epic brought suit to obtain a refund for the
$1,727,790.27 of sales tax that its customer, AirNet Systems
(AirNet), “paid . . . on its purchases of jet fuel from Epic” over
the course of a little over three years.8 As such, it was AirNet’s
operations that had to accord with the requirements of the stat-
ute to qualify for the exception and ultimately for the sales tax
refund in the tax court.
AirNet owned a fleet of planes and operated as a cargo-service
provider.9 Its “core . . . business” had largely been the delivery of
cancelled checks, but it also delivered “time-sensitive . . .
pharmaceuticals” that frequently required delivery only a few
hours after time of manufacture.10 While it lacked a certificate
of public necessity and convenience, it did hold an air carrier
certificate which expressly allowed for common carriage opera-
tions.11 Most notably, however, AirNet’s representative testified
that AirNet held itself out to the public, and anyone could ac-
cess the company website to request its services.12 This fact was
significant because it got right to the heart of the distinction the
court was making between a service classified as a common car-
rier and a service classified as a private charter.13
The statute at issue in Epic Aviation makes an exception for
the payment of otherwise applicable sales tax for items the pur-
chaser will “use . . . directly in the rendition of a public utility
service.”14 The statute further declares that the definition of
“public utility service” includes those who have a certificate of
public convenience and necessity issued by the federal govern-
ment.15 Naturally, then, the court in this case was interested in
determining how an air carrier could be classified as a public
utility service provider. This involved examining the govern-
ment regulations of air carriers, since those regulations often
7 Epic Aviation, 74 N.E.3d at 359.
8 Id. at 359–60.
9 Id. at 358, 360.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 361–62.
12 Id. at 360.
13 Id. at 365–66.
14 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5739.02(B) (West 2015).
15 Id. at § 5739.01(P).
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unilaterally dictate whether an air carrier can be classified as a
public utility service provider.16
The implementation of the ADA in 1978 significantly affected
the airline regulatory environment, and the requirements appli-
cable to AirNet were no exception.17 For AirNet to operate as an
air carrier, both economic and safety regulations applied.18
These regulations dictated, in part, how the court would view
AirNet’s purchase of jet fuel for its operations.19
In this case, the court focused on the economic regulations.
AirNet satisfied its economic regulation obligations as a Part 135
air taxi operator.20 Further, Part 298 of the same regulation21
did not require AirNet to obtain a certificate of public necessity
and convenience to engage in the services it provided.22 This
fact proved significant in the eyes of the Ohio Supreme Court in
a prior case.23
The tax commissioner ruled that “AirNet’s lack of a certificate
of public convenience and necessity [from the federal govern-
ment], along with other similarities” to prior companies who
failed to qualify for the exception, was sufficient to deny Epic’s
claim for a refund of sales tax paid.24 The Board of Tax Appeals
agreed, although it clarified in its decision that the lack of a
certificate of public necessity and convenience was not a suffi-
cient reason on its own.25
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In this case, the court had to decide whether Epic proved that
AirNet should have qualified as a public utility service provider
per the Ohio statutes.26 It looked first to the applicable statute.
Upon first hearing the case, the tax commissioner declared that
16 See Leonard A. Ceruzzi, Quasi-Regulation of a Deregulated Industry by a Safety
Agency, 54 J. AIR L. & COM. 889, 892 (1989).
17 Id.
18 See Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 847 N.E.2d 420, 422 (Ohio 2006).
19 See id. at 421–22.
20 14 C.F.R. § 135 (2014).
21 14 C.F.R. § 298 (2005).
22 Castle Aviation, 847 N.E.2d at 422 (“While Section 298.11, Title 14, C.F.R.
provides that air taxi operations may be exempted from the economic require-
ment to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity, there is no pro-
hibition against . . . voluntarily choosing to obtain [one].”).
23 Id.
24 Epic Aviation, L.L.C. v. Testa, 74 N.E.3d 358, 362 (Ohio 2016).
25 Id.
26 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5739.02(B) (West 2015); id. at § 5739.01(P).
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the lack of a certificate of public necessity was a significant rea-
son for AirNet’s failure to qualify for the tax refund.27 In argu-
ment before the Ohio Supreme Court, the tax commissioner
went further, claiming that such a certificate was a “prerequisite”
per the applicable statute.28 On appeal, the Board of Tax Ap-
peals stopped short of declaring such a requirement but did af-
firm the commissioner’s decision.29 The Ohio Supreme Court
examined the language of the statute and declared that it clearly
does not require the certificate, rather it merely includes those
who do in fact hold one.30 The court further noted that both the
commissioner and the Board of Tax Appeals relied on its prior
decision in Castle Aviation.31 It also noted that, since that prior
decision, the Ohio legislature amended the applicable statute.32
The court seemed to imply that these amendments were signifi-
cant to its ruling in the principal case and perhaps hinted that it
may have overlooked the effect of its ruling in Castle Aviation.33
After declaring that the statute did not require a certificate of
public convenience and necessity, the court turned to prior case
law. Specifically, it addressed its prior decision in Castle Avia-
tion.34 In that case, the Supreme Court of Ohio faced a similar
question: whether Castle Aviation, Inc. (Castle) should qualify
for the sales tax exception as a public utility provider.35 It re-
viewed several cases and determined that “one of the most im-
portant criteria, if not the most important . . . is special
regulation and control by a governmental regulatory agency.”36
Applying that observation to the facts in Castle Aviation, the
court determined that Castle did not qualify.37
In Castle Aviation, the court reviewed five prior tax law cases.38
The first case it reviewed showed that a taxpayer need not only
be certified as a common carrier but that it also needed to be
operating as one to qualify for the sales tax exception.39 Another
27 Epic Aviation, 74 N.E.3d at 362.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 359.
31 Id. at 362.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 365.
35 Castle Aviation, Inc. v. Wilkins, 847 N.E.2d 420, 421 (Ohio 2016).
36 Id. at 425.
37 Id. at 427.
38 Id. at 423–25.
39 Id. at 423.
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case was particularly noteworthy in the eyes of the court; it ob-
served that the taxpayer did not qualify for the exception be-
cause it was not subject to regulatory approval as a prerequisite
for running its business.40 The court overlooked another case in
which a taxpayer was not regulated, but nevertheless qualified
for the sales tax exception.41 Because the rule that the tax com-
missioner relied on in that case was subsequently repealed, the
court disregarded it for its analysis in Castle Aviation.42 Yet an-
other case explicitly declared that agency regulation was a pri-
mary consideration in determining if a taxpayer qualifies as a
public utility.43 Finally, the court reviewed a case that explained
the level of regulation required for a business to qualify for the
exception.44 Thus, in Castle Aviation, the court declared that the
most important factor was significant governmental agency
regulation.45
Applying that rule to the facts in the principal case, the result
would likely have been the same, since it appears that AirNet
was under the same level of governmental agency regulation as
Castle as a Part 135 air taxi operator.46 However, the court rec-
ognized another issue. Citing a “general federal deregulation”
trend, it noted that focusing on regulatory oversight of a tax-
payer’s business operations—an extensive oversight at that—
would potentially preclude any air carrier from qualifying for
the exception at all.47
To resolve the issue, the court turned to a case involving a
motor carrier and deemed that the test for status as a public
utility in that case could be applied to an air carrier as well.48
Equating common carrier status with public utility status, the
court then turned back to an air carrier case to tie it in with the
tax issue.49 The test would now be two-fold: (1) whether the air
40 Id. at 423–24.




45 Id. at 425.
46 See Epic Aviation, L.L.C. v. Testa, 74 N.E.3d 358, 360–61.
47 Id. at 364–65; see Ceruzzi, supra note 16, at 898–99 (noting that passage of
the ADA caused big changes, given the interdependent nature of the air trans-
portation system); see also Michael A. Katz, The American Experience Under the
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 – An Airline Perspective, 6 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
87, 93 (1988).
48 Epic Aviation, 74 N.E.3d at 363.
49 Id. at 364.
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carrier was acting as a common carrier and (2) whether the na-
ture of its service was such that the “public . . . ha[d] a legal
right to demand” the service of the air carrier and receive it.50
The court acknowledged that it overemphasized a single factor
in Castle Aviation. It amended its prior holding to provide clarity
for the aviation community and for the tax commissioner going
forward.
III. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court of Ohio correctly interpreted the plain
language of the applicable statute and properly amended its
own reasoning in a prior case to clear up this foggy area of law.
A. THE STATUTE INCLUDED HOLDERS OF A CERTIFICATE
The court held that the language the Ohio legislature added
in the last sentence for the definition of “public utility” in Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 5739.01(P) merely included holders of a cer-
tificate of public convenience and necessity.51 While the tax
commissioners argued before the court that such a certificate
was a prerequisite, even the commissioners stopped short of de-
claring so much in their opinion.52 Not only is the language
clear, but prior case law never indicated that “includes” was
meant to exclude anyone.53 Even the dissent agreed that such a
reading was untenable.54
B. THE COURT ALIGNS CASTLE AVIATION WITH THE
“DEREGULATED” ENVIRONMENT
The Supreme Court of Ohio amended its failure to wade
through the effects of the ADA in its 2006 Castle Aviation hold-
ing with an admirable opinion that redefines the law for sales
tax exceptions in air law in Ohio. The analysis in Epic Aviation is
inexorably tied to that which it engaged in with Castle Aviation.55
It started to evaluate Castle’s claim with a factor analysis but
seemed to settle on what it decided was the most important cri-
terion: regulation by a governmental agency.56 That focus mis-
50 Id.
51 Id. at 362.
52 Id. at 362–63.
53 Id. at 362.
54 Id. at 368.
55 See id. at 364–65.
56 Id. at 365.
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led lower courts and likely confused air carriers.57 In fact, the
Ohio legislature stepped in immediately following the court’s
ruling in Castle Aviation in an apparent attempt to clarify what
had become muddled.58 But while Castle Aviation was wrong, the
court’s decision in this case to clarify its prior reasoning was
right.59
Regulation in the airline industry has a turbulent history.60
The passage of the ADA had several intended effects, among
them to make small air carriers, like AirNet, more competitive
and to attract more capital to the airline industry.61 While many
of the intended benefits did come to fruition,62 shifting the reg-
ulatory responsibilities between government agencies has come
with some difficulties,63 the effects of which continue to present
themselves in Epic Aviation. After the ADA, many continue to
believe that the airline industry is far less regulated than it once
was.64 But in fact, “nothing less than a systematic, comprehen-
sive compliance program will suffice” to meet the regulations
airlines face today.65
This makes the court’s focus on regulation by a government
agency in Castle Aviation difficult for two reasons. First, all air
carriers, whether classified as Part 121, Part 135, or some other
classification of the Federal Aviation Administration, face signifi-
cant regulation today.66 Because all air carriers face significant
regulation, it would seem to follow that all should qualify for the
exception from sales tax under this Ohio statute, given the hold-
ing in Castle Aviation.67 This clearly was not the desired purpose
57 Id. at 363 (“The BTA considered and rejected [Castle’s] claim ‘in reliance
upon the earlier case law’” (emphasis added)). Consequently, the BTA in Epic
Aviation “devoted little attention to Epic’s argument that AirNet was a common
carrier in a manner different from the charter service whose attempt to obtain
exemption in Castle Aviation was denied.” Id. at 362.
58 Id. at 365.
59 Id. at 363.
60 See Ceruzzi, supra note 16, at 892 (passing the ADA brought significant
change to the airline industry, some of which was neither expected nor desired).
61 See Laurence E. Gesell & Martin T. Farris, Airline Deregulation: An Evaluation
of Goals and Objectives, 21 TRANSP. L.J. 105, 108 (1992).
62 See Ceruzzi, supra note 16, at 892 (noting that the passage of the ADA signifi-
cantly increased the delivery of overnight small packages by air).
63 See id. at 917.
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of the statute and perhaps not even the intent of the Ohio Su-
preme Court. Second, the changes in the regulatory environ-
ment were significant in the decade following the ADA and
appear to continue to be in flux.68 As such, if the test remained
tied to governmental regulation of a taxpayer’s business, qualifi-
cation for the exception would fluctuate right along with it,
tracking a different measure than the legislature likely intended.
The court appears to grasp this reality.69 It addresses it too,
albeit not directly.70 In doing so, it not only moves away from the
problems associated with regulation but settles on a test that is
both easier to apply and more closely tied to the probable intent
of the legislature.71 After all, case law in areas outside of tax
equate common carrier status with that of a public utility ser-
vice,72 why shouldn’t tax law do the same?
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, the court allowed Epic the opportunity to have its
day before the tax commissioner once more, remanding the
case all the way back down.73 This, again, was the right move.
Given that Epic’s claim for a refund on all fuel purchases would
have been denied because it appeared that a portion of its ser-
vices were not those of a common carrier, the court allowed
Epic to amend its claim.74 This too was in compliance with appli-
cable case law because the court deemed it unforeseeable that
Epic would have anticipated such a significant change in the
law.75 This, perhaps more than any other fact, betrays the admis-
sion of the Ohio Supreme Court that its prior decision was
wrong. As it applies to tax law in a season of major tax reform
discussion at the highest level of government—and every other
area of law—courts would do well to follow the example of the
Ohio Supreme Court in Epic Aviation.
68 See Ceruzzi, supra note 16, at 892.
69 Epic Aviation, L.L.C. v. Testa, 74 N.E.3d 358, 363 (Ohio 2016).
70 Id. (While the court does cite federal deregulation as the purpose for its
decision to revisit Castle Aviation, it stops there, choosing not to discuss its reason-
ing any further.).
71 See id. at 365.
72 Id. at 363.
73 Id. at 367–68.
74 Id. at 365–67.
75 Id. at 367.
